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Abstract Popular models for decision making under ambiguity assume that people
use not one but multiple priors. This paper is a first attempt to experimentally elicit
the min and the max of multiple priors directly. In an ambiguous scenario we mea-
sure a participant’s single prior, her min and max of multiple priors, and the valuation
of an ambiguous asset with the same underlying states as the ambiguous scenario.
We use the min and the max of multiple priors to directly test two popular multiple
priors models: the maxmin model and the α maxmin model. We find more support
for the α maxmin model: although people put about twice the weight on the mini-
mum of multiple priors, they also consider the maximum. Furthermore, we indirectly
elicit confidence weights over the whole set of multiple priors and test two additional
models: variational preferences and the smooth model of ambiguity. Two particu-
lar versions of the variational preferences model explain less than the α maxmin but
more than the maxmin model. Overall, the smooth model of ambiguity performs best
among all models tested.
Keywords Ambiguity models · Multiple priors · Asset valuations · Ambiguity
experiment
 Jianying Qiu
j.qiu@fm.ru.nl
1 Department of Economics, Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, Thomas
van Aquinostraat 5, 6525GD Nijmegen, The Netherlands
2 School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology,
Nanjing, China
3 School of Economics, Utrecht University, Kriekenpitplein 21-22, 3584EC Utrecht, The
Netherlands
56 J Risk Uncertain (2016) 53:55–74
JEL Classifications C91 · D81
1 Introduction
In many real world situations there is too little information to form a unique prior
that individuals feel confident enough to use as a sole base for decision making. In
such situations of ambiguity, people may have not one but a set of priors, or ‘multi-
ple priors’, which they consider in their decision making process. Some of the most
popular models for decision making under ambiguity, which are used to explain the
valuation of ambiguous assets, explicitly consider multiple priors: the maxmin model
of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the α maxmin model of Ghirardato et al. (2004),
the variational preferences model of Maccheroni et al. (2006), and the smooth mod-
els of ambiguity by Klibanoff et al. (2005). In the quest to find out which of these
models best explains real decision making, a substantial body of the pertinent litera-
ture provides empirical tests (see, e.g., Ahn et al. 2014, Hey et al. 2010, Cubitt et al.
2014 and the references therein). The results are mixed, however. We argue that one
reason for this is that the predictions of the models were tested, but their underlying
mechanisms were not. The latter would involve the elicitation and characterization
of multiple priors, which has not been done yet. Hence, in order to understand how
people use multiple priors in decisions under ambiguity, this paper attempts to mea-
sure beliefs with multiple priors and then uses these multiple priors to test the above
mentioned models of decision making under ambiguity.
Characterizing beliefs under ambiguity when it is possible to have multiple priors
is tricky as it calls for higher orders of beliefs. Consider, for example, an ambiguous
Ellsberg urn (Ellsberg 1961) with ten balls that are either white or black. A first-
order belief refers to the overall (expected) probability of a drawn ball being white
or black.1 If we want to study beliefs involving multiple priors, we need to elicit an
individual’s second-order beliefs, that is her confidence weights for all potential pri-
ors.2 Such a procedure can be complicated and counter-intuitive. While it is difficult
enough to properly elicit one prior, it appears to be impossible to elicit more than
one prior from the same individual. Even if such a procedure could be implemented,
it would be difficult to find an incentive compatible mechanism for it. Note that, to
properly incentivize individuals to report their multiple priors and their respective
confidence weights, we need to make sure that at least one of the multiple priors
actually occurs; otherwise individuals cannot benefit from reporting sincere beliefs
1Strictly speaking, since a prior is a belief system that completely describes an individual’s subjective
beliefs about the ambiguous scenario, we would need 11 first-order subjective beliefs, with each belief cor-
responding to the individual’s likelihood estimation of one of the 11 potential underlying states. Namely,
11 first-order subjective beliefs constitute one prior. Using the overall (expected) probability of a drawn
ball being white or black as a prior is a simplification common in the literature. Such a simplification is
not always warranted, though (see Klibanoff et al. 2012 for a discussion)
2In the maxmin model and the α maxmin model, one only needs the set of multiple priors, not the con-
fidence weights on the set of priors. In the smooth model of ambiguity both the set and the confidence
weights are needed.
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(or lose when reporting fake ones). In almost all real world scenarios, however, only
a potential state in a prior is realized but never a prior itself.
As a first objective, this paper attempts to elicit the min and the max of multiple
priors. To measure beliefs with multiple priors we construct an ambiguous scenario
for which we first elicit experimental participants’ ‘single prior’. For an incentive
compatible elicitation of multiple priors, we exploit the uncertainty about other par-
ticipants’ single priors to indirectly elicit a subject’s own perception of uncertainty in
the ambiguous scenario. Explicitly, we ask each participant, without any additional
information, to state her confidence weights over all other experimental partici-
pants’ single priors. As the real distribution of other subjects’ single priors can be
easily obtained from the experimental data, the elicitation of confidence weights
for these priors can be properly incentivized. We argue that the confidence state-
ments of a participant about others’ priors indirectly reflect her own perception of
uncertainty in the ambiguous scenario. Note that, when having to guess the priors
of other experimental participants in the absence of any additional information, the
best participants can do is to use their own set of multiple priors. This claim is
essentially the “impersonally informative” assumption of Prelec (2004). Given the
participants’ own set of multiple priors, in particular the min and the max of pri-
ors, and being uncertain about other participants’ decision models of ambiguity, a
participant — whatever her own decision model is — knows that there is some pos-
sibility that her own min and max of multiple priors will be reported by others. We
define the min (max) of multiple priors of a participant as the most pessimistic (opti-
mistic) prior that receives a positive confidence weight. Having obtained the min
and the max of priors, we go one step further and explore the possibility that the
confidence statements of a participant about others’ priors might indirectly reflect
her own perception of uncertainty in the ambiguous scenario. Hence, a participant’s
confidence statements can be interpreted as her ‘confidence weight distribution’ of
(multiple) priors. Although this interpretation requires a leap of faith, it is not far-
fetched. Note that it is cognitively very demanding to think of other participants’
single priors. For this, each participant would have to imagine and compute mul-
tiple alternative processes and decision rules according to which a set of multiple
priors is aggregated into a single prior. In comparison, it is much more intuitive and
straightforward for participants to simply state their own confidence weight distri-
bution. This idea has been explored in some studies implicitly and indirectly. Ilut
and Schneider (2014) point out that the distribution of survey forecasters is often
used as a measure of ambiguity since disagreement of experts plausibly reflects
uncertainty about what the right model of the future is. Here we use participants’
own uncertainty about others’ opinions as a measure of ambiguity. We make a first
attempt to systematically apply this idea to elicit a confidence weight distribution
of multiple priors. To examine the validity of this claim, we analyze the role of
the confidence weight distributions of multiple priors in the participants’ percep-
tion of the constructed ambiguous scenario, e.g. in the evaluation of ambiguous
assets.
Eliciting an individual’s beliefs about others’ behavior is nothing new. It is fre-
quently done in experiments with strategic games, (see Crawford et al. 2013 for
a recent review). However, our purpose of belief elicitation is entirely different:
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in experiments with strategic games beliefs are used to check the consistency of
strategies and beliefs or to investigate the depth of an individual’s strategic deliber-
ation of her opponents, whereas here the elicited beliefs are used to gain a deeper
understanding of the individual’s perception of an ambiguous scenario, not of her
opponents.
As a second objective, this paper tests four popular ambiguity models of multiple
priors: the maxmin model, the α maxmin model, the variational preferences model,
and the smooth ambiguity model. In contrast to previous studies, the elicited min and
max of multiple priors, together with the confidence weight distribution of multiple
priors, allows us to test these models more directly.
Our results suggest that, when comparing the maxmin model and the α maxmin
model, subjects consider both the max and the min of multiple priors in the evaluation
of the ambiguous asset. Although they seem to place more weight on the minimum,
we find more support for the α maxmin model than the maxmin model. The estimated
weight on the minimium, α, is about 2/3. A likelihood ratio test suggests that the
improvement in the explanatory power is statistically significant. We tested two par-
ticular versions of the variational preferences model. The explanatory power of our
specifications of the variational preferences model stand between the maxmin and
the α maxmin model. We find that participants’ confidence statements about others’
priors have significant explanatory power for their own valuation of the ambiguous
asset. This result provides strong support for the interpretation of confidence state-
ments as a participant’s confidence weight distribution of own priors. Encouraged by
this result, we performed a test of the smooth model of ambiguity and find that it
performs best among the four multiple priors models. Furthermore, we find that the
estimated coefficients of the priors are generally increasing in confidence weights, a
pattern that is consistent with the prediction of the smooth model of ambiguity.
The paper complements a growing literature that experimentally tests various
models of ambiguity by developing and analyzing competing predictions that dis-
criminate between the different approaches (see, e.g., Hey et al. 2010; Cubitt et al.
2014). Many of these studies explicitly use the complete set of probability measures
over states as the set of multiple priors, and, hence, the support of the probability
measures as the minimum (min) and maximum (max) of multiple priors. The prob-
lem with this approach is, however, that the set of priors does not need to be equal to
the complete set of probability measures (Baillon et al. 2011). Furthermore, previous
studies did not account for a confidence weight distribution of priors, although the
smooth model of ambiguity explicitly calls for it.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the four mod-
els of multiple priors and presents the experimental design. Section 3 reports and
discusses the experimental results and Section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental design
The core of our experiment consisted of four parts: (1) the construction of sev-
eral ambiguous scenarios; (2) the elicitation of a single prior for each ambiguous
scenario; (3) the elicitation of confidence weights for all potential priors in each
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ambiguous scenario; and, finally, (4) the elicitation of certainty equivalents for
ambiguous assets with the same underlying states as the ambiguous scenarios. Each
part was administered in several rounds. In the subsections below we provide detailed
design information on each part.
The experiment was conducted in the Experimental Laboratory for Sociology and
Economics (ELSE) at Utrecht University in October 2013. In total, we ran four ses-
sions with altogether 111 participants. All sessions were computerized via zTree
(Fischbacher 2007) and recruitment was done with ORSEE (Greiner 2004). Each
session lasted around 120 minutes. In the experiment we used ECU (experimental
currency unit) instead of euro, with 200 ECU = 1 euro. At the end of the experi-
ment, we randomly chose one round for paying the single prior, a different round for
paying the confidence weights over the priors, and a further different round for pay-
ing the certainty equivalent task. This procedure was communicated to all participants
at the beginning of the experiment. The average payment was 13.43 euro.
2.1 Four popular models of decision making under ambiguity with multiple
priors
Before we start with our experimental design, we briefly summarize the four models
of decision making under ambiguity with multiple priors: the maxmin model (Gilboa
and Schmeidler 1989), the α maxmin model (Ghirardato et al. 2004), the variational
preferences model (Maccheroni et al. 2006), and the smooth models of ambiguity
(Klibanoff et al. 2005). Let S denote the set of all possible states of nature, and s ∈ S
be a state in this set. An event E is then a collection of some s ∈ S. Let (S) denote
the set of all possible first-order beliefs over S, i.e., (S) is the set of priors, and
δ ∈ (S) be one prior. An act is a function f that assigns a monetary outcome to
each s ∈ S. The expected utility of act f when the decision maker has prior δ(S) is
then denoted as Uδ(f ). The maxmin preferences (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989) can
then be written as
MEU(f ) = Minδ∈C Uδ(f ),
where C ⊆ (S) is called the set of relevant priors, and, in general, C is a strict
subset of (S), i.e., not all priors in (S) are relevant for the decision maker. The α
maxmin model (Ghirardato et al. 2004) is a generalization of the maxmin model and
can be summarized as
αMEU(f ) = αMinδ∈C Uδ(f ) + (1 − α)Maxδ∈C Uδ(f ),
where α is a constant capturing ambiguity attitudes, and when α=1 we have the
maxmin model. The variational preferences by Maccheroni et al. (2006) can then be
represented by
VP (f ) = Minδ∈(s) {Uδ(f ) + c(δ)} ,
where c(δ) is an index of ambiguity aversion assigned to prior δ. The maxmin model
is a special case of the variational preferences when c(δ) = 0 if δ ∈ C and c(δ) = ∞
if δ /∈ C. Finally, the smooth models of ambiguity (Klibanoff et al. 2005) can be
written as
SA(f ) =
∫
(s)
φ(Uδ(f ))dμ(δ),
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where μ(δ) is the second-order probability distribution, capturing the decision
maker’s confidence weights over the priors, and the ambiguity attitudes are captured
by the curvature of φ(·). When there are only two acts and two outcomes (one either
wins or loses), as constructed by us below, we could normalize the utility of winning
to be one and that of losing to be zero. Let E denote the event of winning, X be the
payoff in case of winning (f (s) = X for all s ∈ E), and Y the payoff in case of
losing (f (s) = Y for all s ∈ S  E). With X > Y and the normalization u(X) = 1
and u(Y ) = 0, we have Uδ(f ) = δ(E). When no confusion is possible, δ(E) can be
reduced to δ. Accordingly, the above representations can be simplified to
MEU(f ) = Minδ∈C δ, (1)
αMEU(f ) = αMinδ∈C δ + (1 − α)Maxδ∈C δ, (2)
VP (f ) = Minδ∈s {δ + c(δ)} , (3)
SA(f ) =
∫
(s)
φ(δ)dμ(δ). (4)
2.2 Construction of the ambiguous scenario
We wanted to make sure that the procedure of constructing the ambiguous scenario
was transparent, while the scenario itself would be ambiguous. We therefore imple-
mented the following procedure. One day before the experiment, we prepared 100
chips, of which 10 chips had the letter A, 10 chips had the letter B, and so forth until
letter J. We then wrapped each chip with kitchen aluminum foil and asked the son of
one of the authors (a 4-year-old boy) to fill five bags with 10 chips each. We used
50 chips out of 100 to make sure that the chip compositions in different bags are not
correlated, e.g. the chip composition in one bag cannot be used to predict the chip
composition in another bag. As the experimental assistant was very young, we con-
trolled the bags to make sure that there were exactly 10 chips in each bag. In the lab,
the above procedure was explained to the participants. Additionally, to make things
more explicit, we explained that not all bags contained all letters, but that any bag
could contain several chips with the same letter and some letters not at all.
The experiment consisted of 5 rounds. Each of the 5 bags was used for one round,
with Bag 0 for the trial round, Bag 1 for Round 1, Bag 2 for Round 2, etc. The trial
round was not payoff relevant. It served to give subjects an opportunity to become
familiar with all experimental steps. The following 4 rounds were formal experimen-
tal rounds and relevant for experimental payments. In each of the 5 rounds, we went
through the three decision tasks as explained in more detail in the following three
subsections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.
Previous literature shows that subjects’ ambiguity attitudes differ with winning
probabilities (see, e.g., Abdellaoui et al. 2011). In particular, subjects can be ambigu-
ity seeking with small winning probabilities and ambiguity averse with large winning
probabilities. For this reason we varied the winning probabilities across rounds, with
an ambiguity-neutral winning probability of 0.4 in the trial round, 0.1 in Round 1, 0.3
in Round 2, 0.5 in Round 3, and 0.7 in Round 4. We implemented the variation in the
ambiguity-neutral winning probability using the following procedure: before each
round, participants were allowed to pick a certain amount of ‘winning letters’ from
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the 10 letters mentioned above. Depending on the round, participants could pick 4
winning letters (out of 10) for the trial round, 1 winning letter for Round 1, 3 winning
letters for Round 2, 5 winning letters for Round 3, and 7 winning letters for Round
4. At the end of the experiment, we picked one of the rounds at random and played
the lottery for real: a participant won 1000 ECU if a randomly drawn chip out of the
bag matched (one of) the chosen winning letter(s) and 0 ECU otherwise. Hence, the
amount of winning letters directly determined the ambiguity-neutral probability of
winning 0 ECU.
2.3 Elicitation of single priors
At the beginning of each round, we elicited every participant’s subjective estima-
tion of the probability — the single prior — that the drawn chip matched her chosen
winning letters. There are various methods available for such a belief elicitation:
non-incentivized introspection, outcome matching, the probability matching method,
quadratic scoring rules, and corrections of quadratic scoring rules and the outcome
matching method. Introspection is rarely used as the main method in economic exper-
iments and outcome matching is not incentive compatible. The probability matching
method is incentive compatible, relatively simple in its experimental implementation,
and easy to understand.3 As shown in subsection 2.4, the simplicity and minimal
cognitive demand of the single prior elicitation is crucial in this study because single
priors form the basis for the elicitation of multiple priors and the confidence weight
distribution. If the elicitation of single priors is already cognitively demanding, the
elicitation of multiple priors becomes overwhelming. Based on these considerations,
we have chosen to administer the probability matching method as our main mech-
anism to elicit first-order beliefs. Quadratic scoring rules are not entirely incentive
compatible due to the assumption of risk neutrality, and the correction of quadratic
scoring rules are procedurally complicated and not very efficient. However, quadratic
scoring rules have the advantage that they elicit expectations by aiming directly at
subjective beliefs and not indirectly through an asset that is constructed on the same
states. As a robustness check, we therefore also conducted an experiment with a
quadratic scoring rule as the primary elicitation mechanism for the single prior.4
The main results reported in the current paper are robust to both elicitation methods.
Therefore, in the following, we focus on the probability matching method.
Figure 1 shows the screenshot of the elicitation of single priors with the proba-
bility matching method. Option A is the ambiguous lottery described in the previous
section. It stays the same in all rows. Option B is a risky lottery paying 1000 ECU
with probability p and 0 otherwise. Option B becomes more attractive when mov-
ing down the rows as the probability p of receiving 1000 ECU increases from 0.1
to 1. We asked participants to report their switching point, at which they started
3For a more systematic discussion please see Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2014).
4Apart from using a quadratic scoring rule to elicit the single prior, that companion experiment has
two other different design features: (1) the constructed ambiguous scenario has binary states; (2) non-
incentivized introspection was used as an additional method to elicit the single prior. For more details see
the companion paper Qiu and Weitzel (2013).
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Fig. 1 Screenshot of the elicitation of single priors with the probability matching method. Option A is an
ambiguous lottery building on the states of the ambiguous scenario
to prefer Option B over Option A.5 We then inferred their single priors from this
switching point. The single prior was computed as the midpoint between the proba-
bilities that corresponded with the row at which subjects switched and the previous
row. For example, if a subject switched at Row 4, we computed a single prior of
1
2 (0.3 + 0.4) = 0.35.
We interpret the inferred probability as one prior δ (see subsection 2.1). A prior
in this setup is, strictly speaking, a first-order probability distribution (pi)11i=1 on the
11 possible combinations of each bag. The probability distribution over the set of
priors, then, is a second-order probability distribution in which each probability is
a confidence weight on a possible probability distribution. Our measure is thus a
simplification, which is common in the literature. For example, Garlappi et al. (2007)
use the estimated expected returns of assets as δ. A further justification is that our
setup has binary outcomes allowing us to normalize u(1000) = 1 and u(0) = 0.With
the normalization, it can be shown that Uδ(f ) = U(pi)11i=1(f ) = δ. Finally, as shown
in subsection 2.4, this simplification is also helpful to keep the elicitation of multiple
priors cognitively and operationally tractable.
2.4 Elicitation of confidence weights for priors
For an incentive compatible elicitation of the probability distribution over the set
of priors S, we exploit a participant’s uncertainty of other participants’ priors to
indirectly elicit her own perception of uncertainty in the ambiguous scenario. Note
5Before they confirmed their choice, an ‘as-if-screen’ displayed all implied choices, i.e. marked all rows
above their chosen row as Option A, and all rows at and below their chosen row as Option B. Subjects
were able to change their decision as often as they liked.
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Fig. 2 Screenshot of the elicitation of the confidence weight distribution of priors. Each possible choice
pattern represents a possible prior. The elicitation is incentivized via the following payoff function:
payoff = Max{0, 1000 − 0.2 × ∑10i=1(wδi − πi)2}, where wδi denotes the proportion of points that an
individual assigned to the prior δi , i = 1, 2, . . . , 10, and πi is the realized proportion of individuals who
report the prior δi , i = 1, 2, . . . , 10
that there are 11 possible choice patterns in the elicitation of single priors in Fig. 1:
‘Possible Choice 1’ where Option B is always preferred, ‘Possible Choice 2’ where
Option A is preferred in the first row while Option B is preferred in all other rows,
..., and ‘Possible Choice 11’ where Option A is always preferred. Each pattern of
possible choices represents one prior δ, and we have 11 possible priors in this setup.
As shown in Fig. 2, we asked subjects to estimate, for each possible choice pattern,
what percentage of all subjects in the session decided for Possible Choice 1, Possible
Choice 2, ..., Possible Choice 10 in the previous decision task.6 Strictly speaking,
confidence weights refer to second-order probability distributions. We asked subjects
to report the proportions instead of probabilities. This was mainly done for practical
reasons, because subjects might not find it intuitive to state probabilities. To make
sure that the interpretation of proportions is meaningful we included a relatively large
group of subjects in each session.7
The payoff for this task was determined by the following function:
payoff = Max{0, 1000 − 0.2 ×
10∑
i=1
(wδi − πi)2},
6Note that ‘Possible Choice 11’, where Option A is always preferred, is missing in Fig. 2. We excluded
this choice pattern as it violates first-order stochastic dominance, i.e., preferring an ambiguous lottery to a
sure payment.
7As noted above, we had about 28 subjects per session.
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where wδi denotes the proportion of points that an individual assigned to the prior δi ,
i = 1, 2, . . . , 10, and πi is the realized proportion of individuals who report the prior
δi , i = 1, 2, . . . , 10.8
Note that δ is the reported prior of an individual, and we interpret the most pes-
simistic (optimistic) prior δi with wδi > 0 as the min (the max) of the multiple priors.
To be precise, (wδi )
10
i=1 is not the confidence weight distribution of the individual’s
own priors but the perception of an individual of the distribution of δ at the popu-
lation level. Yet, as explained in the introduction, and in line with the ‘impersonally
informative’ assumption of Prelec (2004), when having to guess the reported single
priors (δ) of the rest of the population without additional information, the best one
can do is to use one’s own set of multiple priors as a starting point.9 We examine the
validity of this claim in the results section.
Our payoff mechanism does not induce hedging of wδi across πis. One might
think that, for example, a risk averse individual would report a flatter (wδi )
10
i=1 than
her subjective estimations to hedge across choice possibilities, but this should not
be the case. To explain this, let us consider possible effects of risk attitudes on the
reporting of (wδi )
10
i=1 in two scenarios. In the first scenario, individuals have a point
belief distribution over πi , i = 1, 2, . . . , 10. Here the payoff mechanism is incentive
compatible as it is optimal to report wδi = πi, i = 1, 2, ..., 10. In the second
scenario, individuals do not have a degenerated belief distribution over some πis, e.g.,
individuals believe that there is a probability distribution f (p|πi) over certain πis.
Here risk attitudes could influence how subjects report a single wδi out the f (p|πi),
but not hedging across πis. To see this, note that the optimal choice of wδi depends
on the curvature of the utility function. For example, a risk neutral individual would
report the mean of the belief distribution f (p|πi) over the πi , while a risk averse
individual would report something other than the mean. However, such an optimal
choice of wδi , given a certain f (p|πi), occurs within the belief distribution f (p|πi)
but not across πis. One would not deliberately lower a particular wδi and increase
another particular wδj in order to increase the payoff. Hence, risk attitudes would not
induce hedging of wδi across πis and would not increase the dispersion of reported
wδi s. For example, a risk averse subject would never assign a positive wδi to a δi if
she believes that πi equals zero.
2.5 Elicitation of asset values
So far we have elicited the single prior and the confidence weight distribution of mul-
tiple priors. The ambiguity models we set out to test attempt to explain how multiple
priors enter the evaluation of an ambiguous asset. Therefore, we must also elicit the
8The max operator protects participants from substantial negative payoffs. In the experiment participants
did not see the payoff function. Instead, they were informed that the closer their estimations were to the
real distribution, the higher would be their payoffs.
9By using the experimental population distribution of priors as the truth criterion, we are able to prop-
erly incentivize the elicitation of the confidence weight distribution of multiple priors. The use of such a
criterion could bias participants’ confidence weight distributions toward the population consensus. Prelec
(2004) proposes a useful but procedurally demanding alternative to correct such bias.
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Fig. 3 Screenshot of the elicitation of values of the ambiguous assets with the certainty equivalent method.
The number of winning letters in Option A and hence the winning probability changes across rounds as
explained in subsection 2.2. Option C is adjusted according to the winning probability of Option A in
different rounds
values of ambiguous assets that are based on the same states as our ambiguous sce-
narios. By relating these values to the corresponding confidence weight distribution
of multiple priors, we are then able to provide a direct test of different ambiguity
models.
As an ambiguous asset we used the same bag from the previous two decision
tasks in the same round, generating 1000 ECU if a random draw matched a winning
letter and 0 ECU otherwise. We elicited the values of the ambiguous assets with the
certainty equivalent method. As shown in Fig. 3, we constructed a table with 10 rows,
each of which contained two options. Option A was an ambiguous lottery. It paid
1000 ECU if the drawn chip matched one of the winning letters and 0 ECU otherwise.
Option A therefore directly referred to the states of the ambiguous scenario. Option
C was a sure payment. Moving from Row 1 to Row 10, Option C’s sure payment
increased and thus became more attractive, while Option A (the ambiguous lottery)
did not change. We obtained the switching point by asking each participant to state
the first row where she preferred Option C over Option A.10
The certainty equivalent method can be rather lengthy to achieve an accurate value.
The range in this procedure should be wide enough to include possible certainty
equivalent values, and it should be narrow enough for an accurate inference. We used
the ambiguity-neutral winning probability pN as a reference to compute the potential
values of each row as follows:
[1000 × pN × q[n]] ,
10As explained in footnote 5 (subsection 2.3), subjects were able to check and change their choices as
often as they liked.
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where n is the row number, and q[1] = 0.6, q[2] = 0.7, q[3] = 0.75, q[4] =
0.8, q[5] = 0.85, q[6] = 0.9, q[7] = 0.95, q[8] = 1.0, q[9] = 1.2, q[10] = 1.4.
The value of the ambiguous asset is then computed as the mean of the values in the
switching row and in the previous row (analogous to the procedure in subsection 2.3).
2.6 Controls
As explained in the introduction and in subsection 2.4, an important element of our
design is that the elicitation of participants’ multiple priors is based on the estimation
of the other participants’ behavior. For this estimation to be reliable, a participant
has to believe that not only she herself but also all others in the room fully under-
stand the experimental procedure. Otherwise, the estimation of the others’ behavior
would be confounded by a participant’s uncertainty perception of the others’ ratio-
nality. We therefore made a few efforts to reduce this noise. First, we introduced an
extensive trial round. In it we went through each decision with subjects and explained
the implication of each decision. Subjects were encouraged to ‘play around’ and try
different decisions during the trial round. Second, after the trial round we adminis-
tered three exercise questions to check subjects’ understanding of the experimental
procedure. Subsequently, we administered three incentivized test questions. For each
correct answer we paid subjects 200 ECU.11 Finally, after subjects had answered the
three incentivized test questions, we publicly displayed the proportion of students
who answered all test questions correctly. The proportions of correct answers for the
first, second, and third test question were, on average, 92.40%, 91.23%, and 96.50%,
respectively. The public information on the high performance in the test questions not
only established a common level of subjects’ perception of others’ rationality but also
manifested that almost all participants had a similar understanding of the experiment.
We acknowledge that, despite our efforts to reduce individuals’ uncertainty regard-
ing others, the confidence weight distributions (discussed in subsection 2.4) may still
contain not only subjects’ own perception of uncertainty in the ambiguous scenario
but also their uncertainty regarding the capability of others to understand the experi-
ment. In principle, information on the uncertainty of others should not play any role
when one deliberates an own valuation of the ambiguous asset. More importantly, if
the confidence weight distributions primarily reflected the uncertainty about others
rather than one’s own uncertainty about the ambiguous scenario, the elicited con-
fidence weight distributions should not have any explanatory power for subjects’
valuations of the ambiguous assets. The results in Section 3 show that this is clearly
not what we observe. Another possibility is that confidence weight distributions may
capture risk attitudes, and risk attitudes, in turn, explain subjects’ valuation of the
ambiguous assets. We cannot exclude this possibility, although it is neither theo-
retically founded nor empirically supported.12 We are therefore confident that our
measure provides genuinely useful information about subjects’ multiple priors.
11The Appendix displays the three test questions, possible answers, as well as correct answers.
12The probability matching method we use to elicit single priors is immune to risk attitudes (see e.g.,
Trautmann and van de Kuilen 2014, and the references therein), and as we demonstrate in subsection 2.4
risk attitudes should not distort the shape of confidence weight distributions either.
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Table 1 Random effects regressions which predict asset values with (combinations of) multiple priors
Independent Variables MEU α MEU VP(1) VP(2) SA
Intercept 179.56∗∗∗ 36.9709∗ 90.6843∗∗∗ 90.70793∗∗∗ -5.4322
(14.2852) (21.7098) (17.3477) (17.34244) (18.5756)
Mini {δi + θR(δi |δmass )} 6.004∗∗∗
(0.3316)
Confidence weighted prior 7.8025∗∗∗
δweighted (0.3531)
The most confident prior 5.9954∗∗∗
δmass (0.3313)
Min of multiple priors 7.1467∗∗∗ 5.4834∗∗∗
δmin (0.3608) (0.4045)
Max of multiple priors 2.6877∗∗∗
δmax (0.3066)
Degrees of freedom 332 331 332 332 332
AIC 5825.89 5758.92 5805.19 5795.90 5729.263
BIC 5842.26 5779.37 5821.56 5812.26 5745.628
Log likelihood −2908.95 −2874.46 −2898.60 −2893.95 −2860.632
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. ‘MEU’ :
maxmin model; ‘VP’ : variational preferences model; ‘SA’: smooth ambiguity model. In VP(2)θ = 4.8
maximizes the Log likelihood. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.
3 Results
With the min and max of priors at hand and by interpreting confidence weight distri-
butions as probability measures over the set of multiple priors we can analyze how
participants’ valuations of ambiguous assets relate to their multiple priors and to their
confidence weight distributions over the priors.13 This allows us to test multiple pri-
ors decision models directly as each model implies different relationships between
multiple priors or the confidence weight distributions and the corresponding certainty
equivalent (CE) for the ambiguous asset.
Specification 5 empirically replicates the maxmin model (1) by including the min-
imum of the multiple priors (δmin) as the only explanatory variable in a random
effects regression:
CE = Intercept + φi + β1 × δmin + 	, (5)
13In the companion experiment where single priors were incentivized with the quadratic scoring rule (see
Qiu and Weitzel 2013), subjects were forced to report a single prior out of the set of priors. Although it
is intuitive to assume that the aggregation of multiple priors into a single prior is analogous to the way
that multiple priors enter an asset valuation, there is no theory for this. Multiple prior models attempt
to directly explain valuations, but they stay silent on how subjects would aggregate multiple priors into
a single prior. We found that the single priors that subjects are forced to state are best understood as a
confidence-weighted average of multiple priors, rather than the min of their multiple priors, the max of
their priors, or the prior in which they are most confident.
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where CE is the certainty equivalent of the ambiguous asset, δmin is the min of
multiple priors, and φi are individual random effects on the intercept. Model ‘MEU’
in Table 1 shows the estimation results of specification 5 above. We find that the
coefficient of themin of priors is positive and statistically significant. Thus, the valuation of
the ambiguous asset increases in the minimum of a participant’s multiple
priors, δmin.
Although we find support for the maxmin model, it may not be the best description
of the data. We therefore compare the maxmin model with the α maxmin model
(2) by additionally considering the max of multiple priors (δmax) in the following
empirical specification 6:
CE = Intercept + φi + β1 × δmin + β2 × δmax + 	. (6)
Our results show, in line with the α maxmin model, that both the min and max of
multiple priors play a statistically and economically important role with coefficients
of 5.4834 and 2.6877, respectively (see Table 1, Model ‘α MEU’). With these two
coefficients, we obtain an α of 0.6711, indicating that individuals put more weight
on the minimum of priors when evaluating an ambiguous asset.14 In fact, individuals
seem to place about twice the weight on the min of priors (5.4834/2.6877 = 2.04).
However, with an α of 0.6711, subjects clearly consider not only the minimum but
also the maximum of their multiple priors. Hence, in a direct comparison between
the maxmin model and the α maxmin model, the results provide more support for
the latter. In line with this, Log likelihood, Akaike information criterion (AIC) and
Bayesian information criterion (BIC) also show that the overall explanatory power
and informational efficiency of Model ‘α MEU’ in Table 1 are greater than those of
Model ‘MEU’, providing further support for the α maxmin model compared with the
maxmin model. The improvement in the explanatory power is statistically significant
according to a likelihood ratio test (p < 0.01).
The test of the variational preferences model is less straightforward. In the vari-
ational preferences model c(δ) can be interpreted as the relative entropy (or the
Kullback–Leibler divergence) of δ from a reference belief. A direct test would there-
fore require the specification of participants’ reference belief, which we do not know.
We do know, however, participants’ confidence weights for their priors, which pro-
vides us with an intuitive indication of their most likely reference. Below we provide
two specifications of c(δ). In the first specification, note that c(δ) can also be inter-
preted as the cost of considering the prior δ. Such a cost should be related to the
confidence weight on the prior δ. The priors with higher confidence weights should
have a lower cost of considering them and, accordingly, would be more likely to
be considered. In other words, it would be more costly to ignore a prior that one
regards as highly likely. Thus, an approximative but informative specification of c(δ)
can be:
c(δi) =
{
0
∞
ifwδi = maxi(wδi )
otherwise.
14α = 5.48345.4834+2.6877 = 0.6711.
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Namely, one only considers the most likely prior. This reduces the variational pref-
erences model to the expected utility theory with the expectation taken on the most
likely prior. Specification 7 represents such a test of the variational preferences model
under the assumption that participants focus on the prior they are most confident
about:
CE = Intercept + φi + β1 × δmass + 	, (7)
where δmass denotes the prior with the highest confidence weight. In the second
specification we let c(δi) = θR(δi |δmass) = θ [δi ln δiδmass + (1 − δi)ln 1−δi1−δmass ], the
relative entropy of prior δi given the reference prior δmass , subjects’ most confident
prior, where θ is the sensitivity to the cost of considering prior δi . Accordingly the
statistical model becomes
CE = Intercept+φi +Mini
{
δi + θ [δi ln δi
δmass
+ (1 − δi)ln 1 − δi
1 − δmass ]
}
+	. (8)
We let θ vary from 0 to 100 in steps of 0.1 and choose the θ that maximizes the
log-likelihood (θ = 4.8). As we can see from the random effects regression results in
Table 1, the explanatory power of both specifications of the variational preferences
model (Model ‘VP(1)’ and Model ‘VP(2)’ ) —measured by Log likelihood, AIC and
BIC — is superior to the maxmin model but lower than the α maxmin model.
Finally, we examine the smooth model of ambiguity. For this, we conduct two
tests. In a first, simple specification we estimate an empirical model that includes a
confidence weighted average of all priors:
CE = Intercept + φi + β1 × δweighted + 	. (9)
The confidence weighted prior δweighted in specification 9 is a proxy for the right
hand side of Eq. 4. It does not ignore any of the multiple priors but pools them into
one explanatory variable. As we can see in Table 1, the coefficient of δweighted in
Model ‘SA’ is statistically significant and relatively close to 1. Hence, it seems the
confidence weighted prior gives a good explanation of variations in the valuation
of the ambiguous asset. Furthermore, comparing all four regression models, the last
specification provides the best fit, as evident from the comparisons of AIC, BIC, and
Log likelihood. This result also provides support for the interpretation of (wδi )
10
i=1
as a confidence weight distribution of a participant’s priors δi . As discussed in the
introduction, this interpretation is more realistic than first intuition might suggest.
The results in Table 1 give most support to the smooth model of ambiguity.
Encouraged by this result, in a second test, we go one step further and, based on
Eq. 4, use individual weights for each prior with the following specification:
CE = Intercept + φi + β1 × wδ1 + ... + β9 × wδ9 + 	. (10)
This allows us to investigate the curvature of φ(·) in Eq. 4. Note that, according to
the smooth model of ambiguity, βi = φ(δi), where φ(·) is assumed to be increasing
and concave in δi . The regression result is reported in Table 2.
The smooth model of ambiguity predicts that the coefficients βi , i = 1, 2, . . . , 9
in Table 2 should increase monotonically. The result of the random effects regression
is largely consistent with this prediction: the coefficient starts with small and with
negative values for δ1 (−1.7666, p < 0.01), then increases to approximately zero
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Table 2 Random effects
regression which tests the
smooth model of ambiguity with
individual confidence weights
Independent variables Coefficient Standard deviation p-value
Intercept 379.2232∗∗∗ 13.8998 0.0000
wδ1 −1.7666∗∗∗ 0.3714 0.0000
wδ2 −2.8265∗∗∗ 0.3613 0.0000
wδ3 −1.0492∗∗ 0.4415 0.0181
wδ4 −1.3811∗∗∗ 0.3921 0.0005
wδ5 −0.5226 0.4116 0.2052
wδ6 0.3321 0.4013 0.4085
wδ7 2.0463
∗∗∗ 0.4063 0.0000
wδ8 3.1756
∗∗∗ 0.4653 0.0000
wδ9 −2.0068∗∗∗ 0.6530 0.0023
AIC: 5724.19; BIC: 5773.07; Log likelihood: −2850.10
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote
statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
wδi is the confidence weight of
prior δi
for δ5 and δ6(−0.5226 and 0.3321, respectively, not significantly different from zero,
p > 0.10), and subsequently enters positive territory with δ7 and δ8 (2.0463 and
3.1756, respectively, both with p < 0.01).15 To check the increasing pattern of coef-
ficients more concretely we run eight Wald tests to compare the pairs of βi and βi+1,
i = 1, 2, .., 8. The test results confirm that the general pattern is increasing: there are
four significant increases, one insignificant increase, three significant decreases, and
increases are stronger than decreases. Again, the AIC, BIC, and Log likelihood indi-
cate a greater explanatory power of this model than of any other multiple prior model
in previous regressions (see corresponding values of Models ‘MEU’, ‘α MEU’, and
‘VP’ in Table 1).Thus, although the smooth model of ambiguity is not perfectly con-
sistent with individuals’ behavior, it both organizes the data very well and also fits the
predicted general pattern for the coefficients. In conclusion, our experimental results
provide more support for Klibanoff et al.’s (2005) smooth model of ambiguity than
for the maxmin model, the α maxmin model, or the variational preferences model.
4 Conclusion
This study is a first step toward understanding the evaluation of ambiguous assets in
ambiguous scenarios by eliciting both the min and the max of multiple priors and the
confidence weight distribution over multiple priors. We have experimentally elicited
each subject’s prior regarding the states of ambiguous scenarios. To examine the pos-
sibility of multiple priors, in addition to each subject’s single prior, we elicited each
subject’s expectation of other participants’ priors and the confidence weight distri-
bution over those priors. We then used participants’ multiple priors and confidence
weight distributions to explain their valuations of an ambiguous asset, which was
constructed using the same underlying states as the ambiguous scenarios.
15Except for the coefficient of δ9, which is negative and significantly different from zero (p < 0.01).
J Risk Uncertain (2016) 53:55–74 71
We find that, in the valuation of the ambiguous asset, people consider both the
maximum and the minimum of multiple priors. Although people place about twice
the weight on the minimum, in support of the maxmin model, our results provide
more evidence for the α maxmin model. Our two empirical specifications of the
variational preferences model has less explanatory power than the α maxmin but
more than the maxmin model. Overall, we find that the smooth model of ambiguity
performs best among the four multiple priors models.
Our finding that the smooth model of ambiguity explains our data best is in line
with Cubitt et al. (2014), who provide a qualitative test of α MEU and the smooth
model of ambiguity and find greater support for the latter. These results, together with
findings from recent, mostly neuroscientific studies that suggest many processes in
the brain are Bayesian (Friston 2003, 2005; Doya et al. 2007), point to a surprisingly
high level of probabilistic sophistication in subjects.
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